Late last month, the Chinese embassy in Washington wrote a thundering note to a right-wing US senator accusing him of being “arrogant and despicable” and part of a “pernicious political agenda” leading the US down a “wrong and dangerous path”.
The incendiary missive on Ambassador Qin Gang’s watch to Josh Hawley, Republican of Missouri, came after the hawkish senator introduced a bill intended to sanction Chinese President Xi Jinping and other senior Beijing officials over alleged human-rights abuses in Xinjiang .
As Qin ascends to China’s powerful Central Committee, putting him in pole position as China’s next foreign minister, the encounter underscores Washington’s mixed regard for Qin and its perception that the one audience Qin has been inordinately concerned with is the Chinese president.
Should Qin become foreign minister, analysts said they did not expect to see much outward display of independent initiative given China’s system, his relatively limited experience and how beholden he is to Xi, based on his time in Washington.
“In my experience, you have two roles as a diplomat,” said Jeffrey Moon, president of China Moon Strategies and a former US consul general in Chengdu, who listed them as communicating the policies of one’s nation and working to improve relations with the host government.
“He’s been promoted because, like others, he is very faithful to Xi Jinping,” Moon said of Qin. “But on relations with the US, he has not moved things very far.”
Qin’s unexpected promotion has also prompted some self-reflection in Washington on its implications for future US-China relations, the opportunities missed to better connect with the rising star and Washington’s shortcomings in reading China’s opaque political system.
“There have been a lot of surprises, and Qin Gang is one of them,” said a former defence official. “It shows up the level of competence we should have.”
Analysts cite several reasons why Qin has not found deep traction among many Americans.
Qin arrived in Washington in 2021 during a difficult time in US-China relations that only worsened during his 15-month tenure.
The administration of President Joe Biden has maintained most of the tough trade , defence and technology policies of its predecessor, former president Donald Trump , even as a defiant Beijing continued building up its military and nuclear arsenals.
Qin also had trouble shaking his reputation as a wolf warrior – a faction of unapologetic nationalists within the Chinese foreign ministry named after a blockbuster 2015 film.
The senior diplomat gained notoriety for his combative tone as foreign ministry spokesman, with intermittent efforts to soften his reputation in his Washington assignment scarcely bearing fruit.
“Qin Gang is also known for his wolf-warrior diplomacy style,” said Bonny Lin, a senior fellow with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a former China country director for the US defence secretary.
“It would be interesting to see what he takes away from his experience in DC and whether he might view it as a slight that, during his time in DC, he didn’t have the easiest tenure.”
By most accounts, the Tianjin native had a difficult act to follow. Qin acquired most of his experience in Europe , Britain and the foreign ministry in Beijing, and the US assignment was his first ambassadorship.
His immediate predecessor, Cui Tiankai, was ambassador to Japan and China’s longest-serving ambassador to Washington. A foreign-language major, he established a reputation for nuance and personal ties to current and former US government officials and lawmakers.
In addition, Cui often held informal one-on-one talks with Americans, in contrast to Qin, who has at times seemed more comfortable flanked by lieutenants outlining talking points.
In an extraordinary step for a Chinese diplomat, Cui issued thinly veiled criticism of his colleagues’ wolf-warrior approach.
“In the face of complex situations, we must always have the country at large in mind, and not always think about being an internet celebrity,” Cui told a symposium in Beijing a few months after leaving office. China should consider defending its sovereignty in a more thoughtful way, he added.
The Oct 24 note to Hawley from the Chinese embassy appeared to achieve little. US lawmakers routinely submit legislation with little chance of passage – only about 10 per cent become law – and the Xinjiang bill seemed aimed at trolling Beijing to garner publicity.
Sent by embassy counsellor Li Xiang, the note was likely vetted, if not authored, by Qin, analysts said. “Someone on his watch wrote the letter, which may reflect China’s position,” said Moon. “But I don’t think he persuaded anyone and, if anything, probably persuaded Josh Hawley to double down.”
Hawley in fact did just that, taking to Twitter to call China’s response “unhinged” before adding that Beijing “demanded I retract the bill. Not going to happen.”
But others contend Qin, likely already aware of his pending promotion in Beijing and the downside of creating a major dust-up that rivals back home could exploit, played the hand as well as he could by having an underling write it.
Beijing is suspected of detaining some 1 million Uygurs and other Muslim minorities in detention camps in Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region. Beijing, which denies all allegations of forced labour or human rights violations, has characterised them as employment centres. In January, Qin told National Public Radio such reports amounted to “fabrications, lies and disinformation”.
Similarly, defenders credit Qin for responding to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August with a relatively understated Washington Post opinion piece.
China views Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunited by force if necessary. Few countries, including the US, recognise the self-governing island as an independent state.
“The Chinese embassy is walking a fine line between having to respond in a forceful way as demanded by President Xi Jinping and not doing so in a counterproductive way,” said Victor Shih, associate professor at the University of California, San Diego. “He easily could’ve gone overboard, issued a démarche, gone completely wolf warrior.”
Shih, an expert on elite Chinese politics, contrasted Qin’s stance with other Chinese diplomats in the Xi era, most notably the Chinese consulate staff in Manchester, England. The staff’s brawl with protesters last month offended Britons and undercut Beijing’s interests.
“He has not behaved in as aggressive a manner as some had feared,” Shih said of Qin. “He seemed to be trying to be diplomatic. So from my perspective, he’s done a pretty good job.”
Unlike other Communist Party officials promoted during the 20th party congress , Qin was not a long-time confidante who rose through the ranks alongside Xi. His big break reportedly came as protocol director from 2014 to 2017 when he helped arrange Xi’s many overseas trips.
“Coming to Washington from the protocol office where he supported President Xi’s travel and events, he understood who he was working for, knew his boss’ voice, and was protecting Xi’s interests, down to the details of interactions with senior American officials,” said Kevin Nealer, a principal with the Scowcroft Group consultancy and former member of the US President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.
“His ascension is further evidence that Xi intends to surround himself with people whose careers and interests are directly tied to the Chinese president,” Nealer said.
In the weeks and months after Qin’s arrival at New York’s Kennedy Airport, Qin sought to mount a charm offensive, riding tractors with farmers, holding babies, sharing mooncakes with students.
But he never managed to carve out a persona that consistently resonated with his American audience, analysts said, vacillating between bridge-building and strident party-line messaging.
“It could be because his talking points were not persuasive or he’s personally not persuasive or both,” said Moon. “If you have a harsh wolf-warrior message, surprise, surprise, it’s not going to work out that well … That may have gotten him promoted to the Central Committee, but did not help improve relations.”
Other analysts said – beyond the issue of access to high-level US officials – the interest groups Qin met with were long-standing pro-China organisations. In August he jokingly tweeted: “Pandas are not endangered any more! I hope panda huggers will not
“He had the great advantage of a relationship with Xi, but that meant his incentives were solely focused on ‘protecting his quarterback’, not testing what options were available in the relationship or establishing himself as a resource.”
Foreign diplomats in Beijing who worked with Qin have described him as tough in putting forth Beijing’s position, at times “too much so”.
Qin also lacked deep access within the US administration, analysts said, reflecting in part American displeasure over the lack of access granted to US Ambassador Nicholas Burns in Beijing as well as the dismal state of bilateral relations.
They noted Qin failed to forge much of a rapport with White House Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, National Security Council Senior Director for China and Taiwan Laura Rosenberger, or Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
“He has not been someone who has won the respect of the White House,” said an analyst with close ties to the Biden administration. “He’s just not respected by Kurt, Laura, anyone, yet he will be Blinken’s new counterpart.”
The Chinese embassy in Washington and the White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Analysts see fewer communication channels with the retirement of top Chinese envoy Yang Jieqi, a seasoned diplomat with strong English and a good working relationship with Sullivan.
Yang’s US ties date to the George W Bush administration. His successor on the Politburo is expected to be Wang Yi, China’s current foreign minister and a European specialist.
Work reports, Xi’s speeches and the promotions out of last month’s 20th party congress leave little doubt that Beijing views the US as an increasingly hostile, waning adversary intent on holding China back. With loyalty to Xi valued over technocratic expertise, concerns about US-China relations run high as Qin ascends.
“Hopefully he’ll take from his Washington experience a deeper appreciation of the many facets of US interests in China and find it harder to repeat the ‘America in decline’ narrative,” said Nealer.
“He may also understand how much of the negative trend line in bilateral relations is a direct response to changes in Chinese policy, not American actions, that have diminished the space for cooperation.”
This article was first published in Asia One . All contents and images are copyright to their respective owners and sources.
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